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Abstract: Although worship has a pivotal place in religious thought and practice,
philosophers of religion have had remarkably little to say about it. In this paper we
examine some of the many questions surrounding the notion of worship, focusing
on the claim that human beings have obligations to worship God. We explore a
number of attempts to ground our supposed duty to worship God, and argue that
each is problematic. We conclude by examining the implications of this result, and
suggest that it might be taken to provide an argument against God’s existence, since
theists generally regard it is a necessary truth that we ought to worship God.
Introduction
Worship has a central place in religious thought and practice. Religious
rituals are structured around the worship of God, and central theological
notions – such as sin, atonement, and salvation – involve implicit reference to
worship. Yet despite its pivotal role, philosophers of religion have had remarkably
little to say about worship.1 This silence would not be puzzling were it not for the
fact that worship is in many respects an obscure attitude. In this paper we
examine a central question posed by the notion of worship, namely, on what
grounds are we obliged to worship God? We explore four accounts of our
obligation to worship God, and argue that each faces significant obstacles. We
conclude by reflecting on the implications of this result.
Four issues
Worship raises at least four general issues. First, there is the analysis of the
concept of worship. What is it to worship something? To what degree is worship a
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cognitive attitude? In what ways is it related to attitudes such as admiration,
respect, and awe? Can worship be reduced to these notions, or is it sui generis?
Second, what are the appropriate objects of worship? Is worship an attitude that
it is permissible to adopt only with respect to God, or can the theist allow
that the worship of entities other than God is permissible? A third issue is
epistemological : what reasons do we have for thinking that God is worthy
of worship? A fourth issue concerns the grounds of worship. What kinds of
properties could make it reasonable to worship God? What kinds of properties
might make it obligatory to worship God? Might worship have multiple grounds,
or is there a single property in virtue of which it is reasonable and/or obligatory to
worship God?
We will not attempt to address each of these four issues here. Instead, we will
focus on the question of what might ground our putative obligation to worship
God. But to make progress on that issue we have to say something about the other
issues just mentioned – in particular, we need to say something about the nature
of worship itself. We turn to that task now.
The analysis of worship
Worship is clearly a complex activity, and it would seem to resist any
simple analysis. Indeed, it is not at all obvious that one can give a reductive
analysis of what it is to worship something. Nonetheless, we may well be able to
locate worship in its conceptual neighbourhood, drawing attention to the re-
lationships between it and related attitudes.
As has often been noted, worship appears not to be a propositional attitude. In
worshipping someone, one is not related to a content or proposition but to an
intentional object (which might not exist). But despite the fact that it is not itself a
propositional attitude worship seems to be intimately related to propositional
attitudes. In typical instances of worship, the worshipper has certain beliefs about
the object of worship. For example, worshippers typically regard the object of
worship as being morally superior to themselves.
Worship also involves affective and emotional attitudes such as awe, an atti-
tude that might be regarded as a certain type of fear. To worship something seems
to involve judging that the object of worship is more powerful in some respect
than oneself. It is not obvious that the power in question need be a power over
oneself, but it is a power that one lacks. Also internal to the attitude of worship is
reverence – a form of humility and respect. The worshipper regards the object of
worship as greater, in some sense, than herself. In many religious traditions
worship is also taken to involve more straightforward emotional attitudes, such
as love.
In addition to its affective content, worship has, or at least can have, intimate
connections with certain aesthetic attitudes. As Robert Merrihew Adams says,
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‘ the soul of worship is admiration ’.2 Mark Wynn sounds a similar note, suggest-
ing that ‘ in worship the believer relates herself to the marvel of existence, by
placing herself in wonder and adoration before the one in whom all existence is
contained’.3
Another group of attitudes included within the semantic orbit of worship can
be broadly classified as numinal.4 Consider the classic scriptural texts associated
with worship, such as the sixth chapter of Isaiah, in which the notion of worship is
related to the notions of holiness and sanctity. Arguably, to worship something in
a full-blooded sense of the term one must regard it as holy or sacred. Perhaps the
worshipper need not possess the concept of holiness – after all, one can be afraid
without possessing the concept of the fearsome – but it seems plausible to sup-
pose that the worshipper must represent the object of its worship as holy at some
level, even if this representation need not be conceptualized.
It is not easy to say which of these properties might be essential to the notion of
worship and which merely accidental. The concept of worship seems to be
something of a cluster concept. Canonical instances of worship appear to involve
moral, affective, aesthetic, and nominal attitudes of the kind outlined, and it is
plausible to suppose that as one moves further from this core is becomes less
clear whether the attitude in question still qualifies as worship. Consider, for
instance, the question of whether it is possible to worship an entity that one
regards as one’s moral inferior. Perhaps it is. The phenomenon of devil worship
certainly points in this direction, for presumably the person who worships the
devil does not regard the devil as her moral superior.5 But perhaps devil ‘worship’
is not really worship, strictly speaking.
Another reason to wonder whether judgments of moral superiority are an
essential part of worship derives from reflection on Pythagorean practices. It is
sometimes said that the Pythagoreans worshipped numbers. Could this be true?
Over and above the historical reasons for doubting the truth of such claims there
are also philosophical reasons for doubt.6 Could a number really be a possible
object of worship? Perhaps it is possible to regard numbers as mysterious,
awe-inspiring, and beautiful, but it is difficult to see how one could take the kinds
of moral and affective attitudes towards numbers that appear to be part-and-
parcel of core instances of worship. Arguably, worship in the strict sense of the
term is an attitude that one can take only towards agents. Of course, animists
worship rocks, trees and other natural organisms, but in doing so they regard
them as agents of a kind.
Theists clearly hold that God is an appropriate object of worship, but it is less
clear whether theists hold that God is the only appropriate object of worship. Call
the claim that God is the uniquely appropriate object of worship the uniqueness
thesis. We suspect that most monotheists would endorse the uniqueness thesis.
As Exodus 20.3 puts it, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is a jealous
God. Indeed, one might regard commitment to the uniqueness thesis as what
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distinguishes monotheists on the one hand from polytheists and henotheists on
the other.
But do theists really endorse the uniqueness thesis? Many theists venerate
saints and angels, and it seems to be extremely difficult to distinguish veneration
from worship. (Perhaps this explains the ambivalence towards saints and angels
within many branches of Christianity and Islam.) Also at odds with the unique-
ness thesis is our willingness to refer to terrestrial relationships as involving
elements of worship. Children are sometimes described as worshipping their
older siblings, and fans are said to worship their heroes. What might the theist
who endorses the uniqueness thesis say about such cases?
There are two sorts of strategies available to him. On the one hand, the theist
might insist that these relationships typically do not, and certainly should not,
involve worship in the full-blooded sense of the term. When we use the term
‘worship’ in describing a religious person’s veneration of a saint or a child’s
adoration of a sibling we are using it analogically. The younger sibling’s attitude
towards his or her older sibling may have much in common with the devotee’s
attitude to God – for example, both admire and seek to emulate the object of their
adulation – but the differences between themare such that we should not describe
both as having the same attitude towards their respective objects. Perhaps, as
Wynn suggests, ‘ in worship, the believer is engaging in an activity which finds no
real parallel in our relations with created things’.7 The theist who takes this route
has an obligation to say what it is about worship that distinguishes it from similar
relations – such as veneration and hero-worship – that we take to created things.
As yet we have seen no satisfactory answer to this challenge.
An alternative response involves thinking of worship as admitting of degree. On
this view, the theist might want to allow the worship of beings other than God, but
insist that the worship of any other being must be subservient to the worship of
God. The younger sibling is allowed to worship his older brother, and the religious
person is allowed to worship her saint, but both instances of worship should be
subservient to the worship of God.
Although some theists might be sympathetic to this revised version of the
uniqueness thesis, we suspect that most theists will be reluctant to endorse it.
We suspect that the majority of classical theists will insist that God ought to be
the exclusive object of our worship; the worship of other beings – be they saints,
angels, or humans – necessarily detracts from our worship of God.8 But as we
have said, the proponent of this position owes us an account of exactly how
worship differs from these other attitudes. We leave this as an open issue here.
The grounds of worship
Although accounts of the concept of God and the divine attributes rarely
contain any discussion of worship, we take it that most theists hold that God is
302 T IM BAYNE AND YU J IN NAGASAWA
necessarily worthy of worship, in both de re and de dicto senses. With this in
mind, we ascribe the following thesis to the theist :
Reasonableness thesis: Necessarily, it is reasonable for us to
worship God.
The reasonableness thesis is not uncontroversial, but we will accept it
here.9 We introduce it only to distinguish it from another thesis, the obligation
thesis :
Obligation thesis : Necessarily, it is obligatory for us to
worship God.
The distinction between the reasonableness and obligation theses turns simply
on the distinction between what it is reasonable to do and what it is obligatory to
do. As a parallel consider two positions one might adopt towards a work of art.
Someone could refuse to admire Michelangelo’s David despite acknowledging
that the David is the sort of thing that it is reasonable to admire. Similarly, one
could admit that it is reasonable to worship God without accepting that human
beings – or any other beings for that matter – are obliged to worship God. It will
be useful to have a term to describe the property that the obligation thesis as-
cribes to God. Although it is not an entirely perfect fit, we will use the term
‘worshipfulness’ for this property.
Despite the fact that it is stronger than the reasonableness thesis, we think that
most theists would endorse the obligation thesis were they to consider it.
According to Thomas V. Morris, we ‘have a duty to worship God and be thankful
for his benefits’.10 Swinburne sounds a similar note: ‘Worship is obligatory – it is
the proper response of respect by man to his creator. ’11 Further, theists who
identify sin with a failure to worship God – as many do – should be sympathetic
to the obligation thesis.
It is possible that the literature on worship has not distinguished the reason-
ableness thesis from the obligation thesis because the latter has been thought to
follow from the former. But how would such an entailment go? Does the very
concept of worship entail that it is obligatory to worship any entity that it is
reasonable to worship? We can see no entailment here. Certainly there does not
seem to be any such entailment with respect to closely allied concepts such as
love, respect, awe, and admiration. Something can be worthy of admiration, in
the sense that it is reasonable to admire it, without it being the case that all
creatures capable of admiring it ought to admire it. Much the same, we suggest,
can be said of worship.
It is natural to assume that if the obligation thesis is true then it must have a
truth-maker – there must be something in virtue of which we have an obligation
to worship God. What might the basis of God’s worshipfulness be? This question
forms the focus of the remainder of this paper.
The grounds of worship 303
Creation-based accounts
Some theists contend that we ought to worship God because He created
us, and, indeed, continues to sustain us. According to Richard Swinburne,
If there is a God and he has made and sustains the world and issued commands to
men, men have moral obligations which they would not otherwise have. The grounds
for this are as follows. Men ought to acknowledge other persons with whom they come
into contact, not just ignore them – and this surely becomes a duty when those
persons are our benefactors. We acknowledge people in various ways when we meet
them, e.g. by shaking hands or smiling at them, and the way in which we acknowledge
their presence reflects our recognition of the sort of individual they are and the kind of
relation they have to us. Worship is the only response appropriate to God, the source
of all being.12
In a similar vein Robert Merrihew Adams writes, ‘People who worship God do not
normally praise him for his moral rectitude and good judgment in creating us.
They thank God for their existence as for an undeserved personal favor. ’13
A first objection to grounding worshipfulness in creation concerns the status of
beings uncreated by God. The creation-based account would suggest that such
beings have no obligations to worship God, at least if we take the account to
specify the sole ground of worship. We think that this result will strike most theists
as the wrong result. Presumably theists hold that any possible entity (apart from
God) would have an obligation to worship God were it to be actual (and capable
of worshipping God).
In response to this objection, the proponent of the creation-based account
might challenge the claim that beings uncreated by God are possible. The theist
might suggest that God’s role as ultimate cause of all should be understood not
just in terms of everything that happens to exist, but in terms of everything that
could exist. On this view of things, God is the ground of all possible being.
Some theists will find this response persuasive, others may not. There is a
significant current of thought within theism that recognizes uncreated objects
besides God – numbers, propositions, and the like.14 Of course, abstract objects
are not the sorts of things that could worship God, but the point remains that
some theists allow uncreated objects (other than God) into their ontology.
Such theists owes us an argument as to why uncreated objects capable of
worshipping God are impossible if uncreated objects incapable of worshiping
God are possible.
Even if the theist rules out the possibility of uncreated beings (capable of
worshipping God), the objection from uncreated beings has some force as long as
the theist allows that such entities are conceivable. The mere fact that we can
conceive of beings uncreated by God allows us to ask whether such beings would
have obligations to worship God. If the theist answers this question in the
affirmative, then they cannot hold that worshipfulness has its sole ground in the
obligations we owe our creator qua creator.
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There is a second reason to reject the creation-based accounts of worship.
If creation grounds our obligation to worship God, this could only be because
we ought to be grateful to God for having been created, and we could only have
reason to be grateful for having been created if we are benefited by our creation.
Can a person be benefited by their creation? There is good reason to think not.
Arguably, an act can benefit someone only if it leaves them better off than they
were, or at least, better off than they would have been had one not acted. Since we
would not have been had God not created us, our creation cannot benefit us.15
Suppose that someone really believed that bringing a person into existence
is – or at least can be – of benefit to the person created. Such a person would have
reason to attempt to bring into existence as many people as possible, either
through their own procreative powers or by encouraging others to procreate.
Most of us would regard such a strategy of procreative maximization as odd if not
downright perverse. This suggests that we do not really believe that bringing
persons into existence constitutes a form of benevolence to the persons thus
created.16
The proponent of the creation-based account of worship might accept that in
the final analysis the claim that we can be benefited by being brought into
existence is indefensible. Nonetheless, she might insist that it is intelligible
to think of ourselves as having been benefited by having been brought into
existence. And, she continues, perhaps the intelligibility of the claim suffices to
ground the obligation thesis.
We grant that there is a natural sense in which it is intelligible to suppose that
the creation of a person benefits them. We also grant that the intelligibility of this
claimmight support the reasonableness thesis : if it is reasonable to think that one
has benefited from having been brought into existence, and if it is reasonable
to believe that one owes one’s existence to God, then it may be reasonable to
worship God. But we are concerned with the obligation thesis rather than
the reasonableness thesis, and the intelligibility of the claim that our creation
benefits us is clearly insufficient to ground the obligation thesis.
A third objection to the creation thesis develops this theme in more detail.
Whether or not it is possible to benefit a person by creating them, it is certainly
plausible to suppose that not everyone is benefited by being brought into exist-
ence. Like Job, many have cursed the day of their birth, and although some such
judgements might be unjustified, it is difficult to believe that everyone does well
by having been created. Some individuals are born into lives of such pain and
anguish that, were their parents to have deliberately created them knowing what
kinds of lives they would be subject to, we would judge them guilty of callousness.
If parents can be held blameworthy for bringing certain types of children into
existence it is at best unclear why we cannot also hold God blameworthy. Do
individuals born into utterly miserable lives have any obligation to worship God,
the source of all being? One might think not.
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At this point the analysis of worship meets up with the problem of evil. Marilyn
McCord Adams has argued that God has an obligation to ensure that every
person’s life is, on the whole, good.17 Adams grants that some individuals meet
with such adversity that, if we were to consider only their terrestrial life, we would
have no option but to regard their existence as being of harm to them. Adams
argues that communion with God in an afterlife could make it the case that,
all things considered, the lives of such people are of benefit to them. Adams’s
proposal provides the theist with a way of responding to the ‘lives-not-worth-
living’ objection.
The issues raised by Adams’s position are wide-ranging, and we cannot hope to
deal with them adequately here. What we can note is that the considerations just
adduced give the theist who wishes to ground the obligation thesis in creation
additional reason to take Adams’s proposal seriously. At the same time, both
those who are sceptical of the notion of an afterlife and those who doubt that
even communion with God could counterbalance an otherwise horrendous life
will regard the problem of horrendous evils as providing additional reason to
reject any attempt to ground worshipfulness in creation.18
A final problem with the creation-based account is that it runs the risk of
‘domesticating’ worship – that is, of presenting it as continuous with attitudes it
is appropriate to take to mundane entities. If our dependence on God gives us
an obligation to worship God, it ought to follow that our dependence on our
parents, our friends, and family, and even our society will generate obligations to
worship these individuals. The theist who emphasizes the uniqueness thesis and
holds that worship has ‘no real parallel in our relations with created things’
will want to resist this inference. Of course, the theist can always insist that our
dependence on God is qualitatively distinct from the dependence we have
on terrestrial realities. God is the ultimate ground of our being, whereas our
dependence on terrestrial realities is merely causal. And since our dependence on
God is of a different order from our dependence on other beings, so too our
response of thankfulness to God should also be of a different order.
Even if we were to accept this distinction between forms of dependence,
the original worry remains: worship has, on this account, been reduced to
thankfulness or gratitude. It has been emptied of its moral, aesthetic, and
noumenal components. This suggests that creation-based considerations can, at
best, provide only a partial account of the grounds of our putative obligation to
worship God.
The maximal-excellence account
Another approach to worshipfulness appeals to God’s intrinsic nature
rather than His relation to us. Robert Merrihew Adams suggests that worship
involves the acknowledgment, ‘not just of God’s benefits to us, but of [God’s]
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supreme degree of intrinsic excellence’.19 In what does God’s excellence
consist, and what might it be about God’s excellence that makes Him worthy of
worship?
It is natural to conceive of divine excellence in terms of the superabundance of
good-making attributes. This is the road taken by Anselmian theology, according
to which God is a maximally excellent being. Call the set of properties that con-
stitute God’s maximal excellence ‘M’, and call those properties included within
M,‘M-properties’. Could M-properties – either singly or in combination – ground
worshipfulness?
Theists typically include perfect goodness, knowledge, power, and presence
withinM. These properties seem to be neither individually nor jointly sufficient to
ground worshipfulness. We can imagine a being who is more knowledgeable,
more powerful, and more ‘present’ than us, and although such properties
might make it reasonable to worship the being in question, they do not appear to
establish the rights of that person to demand worship from us. Worshipping God
for His power or His knowledge seems to smack of fascism. The idea that moral
perfection obligates worship is less objectionable, but not unproblematic. Most of
us recognize various other persons as our moral superiors, yet few of us suppose
that we have obligations to worship such persons. Perhaps we ought to recognize
their moral superiority and aspire to emulate their behaviour, but these attitudes
seem to fall short of worship.
What other properties might be included within M? It is sometimes suggested
that God has a greater degree of being (or reality) than the created order. We
are not particularly sympathetic to this view, but we will waive such worries
here. Could the fact that God has more reality than we do justify our having an
obligation to worship Him? Again, we find it hard to see how an argument for this
claim might proceed.
In our view, the most attractive maximal excellence account of worship
identifies the ground of God’s worshipfulness with a property not normally
included in M: holiness. Worship, on this view, is the appropriate response
to holiness. It is not completely clear how God’s holiness is generally con-
ceived, but we suspect that most theists regard it as primitive. That is to say,
even if God’s holiness necessarily presupposes certain other properties (such as
moral perfection), His holiness does not supervene on His possession of those
properties. Nonetheless, it is plausible to suppose that holiness is a necessary
component of M, insofar as being holy is a great-making property (for persons,
at least).
An obvious objection to the attempt to ground worship on holiness is that
holiness is itself a rather mysterious notion. To use J. L. Mackie’s term, holiness
seems to be queer. Of course, queerness is in the eye of the beholder, and the
theist will no doubt resist any suggestion that there might be something onto-
logically suspect about holiness.
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A more compelling problem for theists is the fact that holiness appears to be a
property that God shares – or at least could share – with other beings. Certain
individuals are described as holy, and there are strains of thought within many
religious traditions according to which the faithful become holy. This suggests
that holiness per se cannot ground worship, for if it did then we would have
obligations to worship other holy beings, and the uniqueness thesis would be
imperilled.
Another problem with the maximal-excellence account concerns the possi-
bility of multiple maximally excellent beings. It seems possible for a world to
contain two beings, each of whom instantiates those properties included within
M. Call one of the two beings ‘God’ and the other ‘God*’. (Here, we are using
‘God’ and ‘God*’ as proper names.) If worshipfulness supervenes on the pos-
session of M-properties then we would have obligations to worship both God and
God*. (Indeed, God and God* would have obligations to worship each other.) This
result is also at odds with the uniqueness thesis.
In response to this objection theists might reject the idea that a being other
than God could be maximally excellent. They might argue that the notion of a
world containing two maximally excellent beings contains a subtle contradiction.
For the record, we cannot see any contradictions in the proposal, but contra-
dictions can be difficult to spot, and perhaps there is something that we are
missing.20 The crucial question here is not whether God* is logically possible – or,
if it amounts to something else, whether the notion of God* is conceptually
coherent – but whether the theist would acknowledge that it would be obligatory
to worship God*, if, per impossibile, God* were actual. If the theist responds in the
negative – as we suspect many theists will – then this casts doubt on the notion
that worshipfulness is grounded in God’s intrinsic excellence. Of course, the
theist might not answer this question in the negative – they might hold that God*
ought to be worshipped. The theist might restrict the uniqueness thesis to worlds
in which God is the only maximally excellent being. We see here the dialogue
between accounts of the objects of worship and accounts of the grounds of
worship.
We conclude this section by considering a variant on the maximal-excellence
theme. In Finite and Infinite Goods, Robert Merrihew Adams suggests that God
is not merely good but is identical with perfect Goodness. We are not sure that
Adams’s suggestion is coherent – could a concrete particular also be a prop-
erty? – but we will grant it for the sake of argument. Even so, Adams’s identifi-
cation of God with Goodness seems unable to ground worship. Why ought we to
worship Goodness? We certainly ought to recognize the goodness of good things,
but it does not follow from this that we ought to worship Goodness itself.
At this point, one might claim that although neither God’s creation of us
nor His maximal excellence individually warrants worship the combination of
them does. But if God is already maximally excellent then His creation of
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us should not add anything to His perfection. And if that is right, then it is hard
to see why only a maximally excellent creator, but not a maximally excellent
being simpliciter, ought to be worshipped. Conversely, if God’s creation is
essential to His perfection, then His creation should be subsumed by His
maximal excellence. Either way, it is difficult to see how the combination of the
two proposals could ground worshipfulness if neither is individually sufficient to
ground it.
The prudential-reasons account
A third approach to worshipfulness looks to prudential reason in order to
ground our obligations to worship God. There are various ways in which such an
approach might be developed. Consider first the ‘big-stick strategy’. Theists of a
certain stripe respond to the question ‘Why should I worship God?’ by pointing
out that the failure to worship God is a sin and sin is punishable by death. This
prudential-reasons account has little philosophical appeal, for it leaves the con-
nection between worship and our wellbeing completely mysterious. We want an
account of worship in virtue of which God is justified in punishing us for not
worshipping Him.
A more appealing prudential-reasons approach conceives of our obligations to
worship God on the model of our obligations to eat well, exercise, and develop
our rational and moral faculties. According to most theists, we are designed to
worship God, and our true fulfilment and happiness is found only in such an
activity. As Augustine put it in his Confessions, our hearts are restless until they
find their rest in God. Perhaps it is this fact that forms the basis of our obligation
to worship God.
Do human beings need to worship something in order to achieve fulfilment?
Perhaps. Certainly the ubiquity of religion suggests that the psychological roots of
worship go very deep. But must the object of our worship be God? At this point
the prudential-reasons account comes up short. The account may be able to
establish that we ought to worship something or other, but it seems unable to
establish that we ought to worship God.
There is also something deeply unsatisfying about the agent-centred approach
taken by the prudential-reasons account. It smacks of the ‘one thought toomany’
problem that aﬄicts certain moral theories. Even if it is true that we would be
better off worshiping God, authentic worship should not be motivated by self-
interest. Consider an analogy. Suppose that I’ve offended Sarah and I feel guilty
about it. Even though it may be true that I will feel better if I apologize to her, my
apology should be motivated by my desire to repair my relationship with Sarah,
not by my desire to feel better about myself. Similarly, even if it is true that
worshipping God brings with it prudential rewards, it should not be motivated by
the prospect of such rewards.
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Groundless worship?
In light of the difficulties theists face in finding an adequate ground for
worship, one might wonder whether worship has grounds. Perhaps God’s
worshipfulness is groundless. Perhaps we have obligations to worship God even
though God has no property, either intrinsic or relational, in virtue of which we
have obligations to worship Him. Call this the brute-fact account. Surely some of
God’s properties are brute. Why couldn’t God’s worshipfulness not be brute?
One might object that if the brute-fact approach were correct then God’s
worshipfulness would be contingent, and if worshipfulness were contingent then
there would be a possible world in which God would exist but we would not have
obligations to worship Him – which is at odds with the necessity thesis.
Now, why might the bruteness of God’s being worshipful entail that God has
this property only contingently? After all, surely a brute property can also be a
necessary property? Well, we are entering some tricky terrain here, but we suggest
that they only brute properties that an entity has necessarily are those that follow
from the nature of the entity in question. Where a brute property is not bound up
with an entity’s nature it seems plausible to regard it as contingent.
For example, consider the property of having developed from a particular pair
of gametes. This property appears to be brute. Is it also a contingent property?
Could a person have developed from a set of gametes other than those from
which he or she actually developed? Not if essentialist accounts of our origins are
correct.21 Essential accounts hold that the property of having developed from a
particular pair of gametes is both brute and necessary. And such accounts have
some plausibility, for essentialism about our origins appears to be in accord with
the kinds of things we are.
But let us consider another situation in which a putatively basic property has
been said to be necessary.22 Consider, she may say, the property of being de-
praved – that is, of committing some sin in one’s life. Plantinga has suggested
that this property, which is presumably brute, is an essential property of certain
people, and that there is no possible world in which such people exist and fail
to commit at least one wrong act.23 We suggest that Plantinga’s proposal is
implausible, for it involves regarding a brute property as necessary even though
the property in question seems not to follow from the nature of the entity con-
cerned. After all, there seems to be nothing internal to the concept of being a
human being that makes it the case that a human being must commit at least one
sin in its life. (And if there were such a claim, then accounts of the incarnation
would be in trouble!). In order to get around this problem Plantinga states that the
transworld depravity might be included in the essence of particular creatures, but
this move seems to be completely unmotivated. We conclude that there is good
reason to think that brute properties that do not follow from the nature of the
entity in question will be contingent.
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Where does this leave the worshipfulness of God? Well, if what we have said
thus far is on the right track, we need to ask what the nature of God is. Might
worshipfulness follow from the kind of thing that God is? At this point we hit an
impasse of sorts, for even if God has a nature – and it is by no means un-
controversial that He does – there is little agreement between theists about how
God’s nature is to be understood. Perhaps all that can be said here is that God’s
worshipfulness would appear to be contingent to the extent that it fails to follow
from properties that are essential to His nature. Of course, theists will differ about
which, if any, properties are essential to God’s nature.
A second reason for rejecting the brute-fact account is that it problematizes the
epistemology of worship. Intuitively, the judgement that a particular object ought
to be worshipped will be based on the evidence that the object in question in-
stantiates those properties that ground worshipfulness. So, if worshipfulness is
grounded in our creation (for example), then we need to look only to God’s cre-
ative activity in order to determine whether or not we ought to follow Him. But if
worshipfulness is primitive, then it is unclear howwemight go about determining
whether or not to worship God. In short, the brute-fact approach complicates the
epistemology of worship. If worshipfulness does not follow from the essence of
God then we need some additional reason to think that God has the property of
being worshipful.
A final problem with the brute-fact proposal is simply that it seems to us that
the question of why we have an obligation to worship God deserves a substantive
answer. If I have an obligation to praise someone, then that person must have a
property that makes it the case that I ought to praise her. Similarly, if I have an
obligation to thank someone, then that person must have a property that grounds
my obligations. Of course, there are some obligations – such as the obligations
children have to their parents – the grounds of which it is notoriously difficult to
specify. But even when we confront such difficult cases, few are inclined to call
into question the claim that obligations must be underwritten by real properties
or relations.
When the grounds of a putative obligation elude identification it is natural for
the obligation itself to be called into question. One might argue that the lesson to
be learnt from the failure to find the grounds of worship is not that worshipful-
ness is brute, but that there is no such property. Here we have the makings of an
argument against the existence of God, for God is typically regarded as demand-
ing of our worship. Of course, any such argument would have to be developed
with care. Sometimes it is reasonable to think that p is the case even when one
has no idea what might make it the case that p. The theist might argue such a
description applies to the necessity thesis : we know what it is true, but we do not
know why it is true. It is always possible for the theist to insist that although God-
worshipfulness is grounded, its grounds are hidden. Nonetheless, insofar as it is
reasonable to think that the grounds of worshipfulness would be scrutable to us,
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our inability to determine what those grounds could be gives us reason to call into
question the claim that we have obligations to worship God.
Conclusion
Theists of many stripes hold that it is obligatory for us to worship God. We
have examined four accounts of why it might be that we have obligations to
worship God, and have argued that none is successful. We do not claim that the
considerations adduced here demonstrate that the necessity thesis is false, but we
do think that they problematize it. At the very least, we hope that they prompt
philosophers of religion to ponder the nature and basis of worship in more detail
than they have to date. Theists who hold that the necessity thesis is internal to the
very concept of God have especial reason to address our concerns, because for
them, our argument threatens not only the worshipfulness of God but His very
existence.24
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